A Theory of International Currency and Seigniorage Competition

Yiting Li and Akihiko Matsui ()
Additional contact information
Yiting Li: Department of Economics, National Twaiwan University

No CIRJE-F-363, CIRJE F-Series from CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo

Abstract: This paper explicitly considers strategic interaction between governments to study currency competition and its effects on the circulation of currencies and welfare in a two-country, two-currency search theoretic model. Each government uses seigniorage to provide public goods. Agents consume private goods, and the public goods of their own country. We have several findings. The negative impact of a country's inflationary policy on the realm of circulation of its currency imposes an inflation discipline: the more open a country is, the stronger is the discipline. The worldwide circulation of a currency increases seigniorage and welfare and decreases the inflation rate of the issuing country compared to autarky. The other country, since the tax base is reduced due to the use of foreign currency, raises its inflation rate. However, there is a limit on the rate beyond which it cannot maintain the circulation of national money. Under strategic interaction between governments in selecting equilibrium, the larger country would try to lower the inflation rate to make its currency circulate abroad, while the other country may also lower the inflation rate to sustain its national currency as the sole medium of exchange.

Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2005-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba and nep-ifn
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2005/2005cf363.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tky:fseres:2005cf363

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CIRJE F-Series from CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CIRJE administrative office ().