Economics at your fingertips  

Voluntarily Separable Prisoner's Dilemma

Takako Fujiwara-Greve () and Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara ()

No CIRJE-F-415, CIRJE F-Series from CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo

Abstract: We develop a general framework to analyze endogenous relationships. To consider relationships in the modern society, neither one-shot games nor repeated games are appropriatemodelsbecausethe formationand dissolutionofa relationship is not an option. We formulate voluntarily separable repeated games, in which players are randomly matched t oplay acomponentgameaswellastochoose whether to play the game again with the same partner. There is no information flow across matches, and players are boundedly rational. We extend the notion of Neutrally Stable Distribution (NSD) to fit for our model. When the component game is a prisoner's dilemma, NSD requires some trust-building periods to defect at the beginning of a partnership. We ?nd that polymorphic NSDs with voluntary breakups include strategies with shorter trust-building periods than any monomorphic NSD with no voluntary separation, and hence the average payo? ofpolymorphic NSD is higher.

Pages: 47pages
Date: 2006-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link) (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CIRJE F-Series from CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CIRJE administrative office ().

Page updated 2022-11-14
Handle: RePEc:tky:fseres:2006cf415