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Voluntarily Separable Repeated Games with Social Norms

Takako Fujiwara-Greve (), Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara () and Nobue Suzuki
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Nobue Suzuki: Faculty of Economics, Komazawa University

No CIRJE-F-715, CIRJE F-Series from CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo

Abstract: We extend the voluntarily separable repeated Prisoner's Dilemma (Fujiwara-Greve and Okuno-Fujiwara, 2009) to continuous actions. We show that there is a (constrained) efficient bimorphic equilibrium which is robust under evolutionary pressure. It consists of a cooperative strategy and a myopic defection strategy so that our model provides a foundation to incomplete information models as well.

Pages: 20pages
Date: 2010-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo and nep-gth
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