Duopoly in the Japanese Airline Market: Bayesian Estimation for the Entry Game

Shinya Sugawara () and Yasuhiro Omori ()

No CIRJE-F-797, CIRJE F-Series from CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo

Abstract: This paper provides an econometric analysis on a duopoly game in the Japanese domestic airline market. We establish a novel Bayesian estimation approach for the entry game, which allows the incorporation of flexible inference techniques. We find asymmetric strategic interactions between Japanese firms, which implies that competition is still influenced by the former regulation regime. Furthermore, our prediction analysis indicates that the new Shizuoka airport will suffer from a lack of demand in the future.

Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2011-04
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2011/2011cf797.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: DUOPOLY IN THE JAPANESE AIRLINE MARKET: BAYESIAN ESTIMATION FOR THE ENTRY GAME (2012)
Working Paper: Duopoly in the Japanese Airline Market: Bayesian Estimation for the Entry Game (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tky:fseres:2011cf797

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