Interlinkage and Generous Tit-for-Tat Strategy

Hitoshi Matsushima

No CIRJE-F-875, CIRJE F-Series from CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo

Abstract: We investigate an infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma with imperfect monitoring and projects the possibility that the interlinkage of the players' distinct activities enhances implicit collusion. We show a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of generous tit-for-tat Nash equilibrium. Such an equilibrium, if it exists, is unique. This equilibrium achieves approximate efficiency when monitoring is almost perfect, where the discount factors are fixed.

Pages: 11 pages
Date: 2013-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Journal Article: Interlinkage and Generous Tit-for-Tat Strategy (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tky:fseres:2013cf875

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