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Free Trade Agreement with Endogenous Market Structure

Lijun Pan and Takatoshi Tabuchi ()
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Lijun Pan: Nanjing University

No CIRJE-F-1089, CIRJE F-Series from CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo

Abstract: We examine the incentives of free trade agreements (FTA) formation between two countries under endogenous market structure with leaders and followers. We demonstrate that establishing an FTA is neither an equilibrium outcome nor social optimum when consumer demand and fixed cost are intermediate and products are close substitutes. This is because the FTA induces exit of followers, which makes the market less competitive and shrinks the leader's production both in the domestic and foreign markets. We also show that developing countries are less likely to establish an FTA than developed countries.

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int
Date: 2018-08
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Handle: RePEc:tky:fseres:2018cf1089