Intergovernmental Competition for Donations: The Case of the Furusato Nozei Program in Japan

Eiji Fukasawa, Takeshi Fukasawa and Hikaru Ogawa
Additional contact information
Eiji Fukasawa: National Diet Library
Takeshi Fukasawa: Graduate School of Economics, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo

No CIRJE-F-1129, CIRJE F-Series from CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo

Abstract: This paper shows that municipalities compete excessively for donations under a unique program called Furusato Nozei (Tax payment to hometown) in Japan. Under the program, people make donations to their favorite municipalities and municipalities that have received donations give "reciprocal" gifts in return. Our estimates show that municipalities facing competition to attract donations provide excessive gifts to donors, and net revenue from the program is 10.4% to 12.1% lower than in a scenario without competition.

Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2019-10
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2019/2019cf1129.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Intergovernmental competition for donations: The case of the Furusato Nozei program in Japan (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tky:fseres:2019cf1129

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