The Impacts of Bank Loans on Economic Development: An Implication for East Asia from an Equilibrium Contract Theory

Shin-ichi Fukuda ()

No CIRJE-F-58, CIRJE F-Series from CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo

Abstract: In this paper, we first show that middle-term and long-term commercial bank loans were less mobile forms of external liabilities but that a large fraction of external bank debt had been financed by short-term loans in a large number of developing countries. We then present a simple theoretical model where the vulnerable financial structure in developing countries might emerge as a result of efficient monitoring activities by competitive private banks. In the model, we assume both asymmetric information and liquidation risk in the international financial market. The existence of asymmetric information calls for the role of a short-term lender in monitoring borrowers' performance. However, since short-term debt can be a source of liquidity problems, total effects of efficient monitoring on economic welfare might be largely reduced when it increases the possibility of a liquidity shortfall.

Pages: 37pages
Date: 1999-08
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Chapter: The Impacts of Bank Loans on Economic Development: An Implication for East Asia from an Equilibrium Contract Theory (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tky:fseres:99cf58

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