"Suffolk Banking System against the Crisis of 1837 - 39 --the Spontaneous Development of "Lender of Last resort" by a commercial bank--" (in Japanese)

Takuma Omori
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Takuma Omori: Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo

No CIRJE-J-79, CIRJE J-Series from CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo

Abstract: In this paper, it is discussed about the point how the Suffolk Banking System could defend against the instability of financial order in New England extending 1837 ]39 Crisis. And is discussed about the point, that is, performing the System, the Suffolk Bank regionally and spontaneously tried to perform the role of quasi-Central Banking, especially the function of "Moral Persuasion" and " lender of last resort", backing for the confidence by state-governmental authorities. "Spontaneousness" in the System is so unique because it is presented the historical evidence both support and criticism in Free Banking Theory. In this analysis, it is proved "Spontaneousness" is not the supporting evidence but the criticizing evidence in F.B.T. as the regional Central Banking making trial movement against the instability of financial order.

Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2002-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tky:jseres:2002cj79

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