"Propensity to Procrasternate and Collective Decisionmaking Systems in Japan"(in Japanese)

Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara () and Toshiaki Kouno
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Toshiaki Kouno: Graduate School of Economics, University of Tokyo

No CIRJE-J-155, CIRJE J-Series from CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo

Abstract: We often see people procrastinate what should be done immediately. This propensity seems to be especially high in Japan as bad loans problem in 1990 exemplifies. Propcrastinations in collective decision making tend to occur when there are many stakeholders. They tend to waste time while trying to avoid responsibility and shifting blame to others. In terms of game theory, corresponding payoff structure is known as the game of chicken. This game has pure strategy efficient equilibria and mixed strategy inefficient equilibrium. Under the best-response dynamic popular become stable, depending upon whether or not role-contingent strategies are available. Whether or not payoff irrelevant role of players, such as role of main-bank and/or role of person in charge of the case, are respected by fellow players may decide the ultimate outcome of the game, hence the extent of procrastination. We discuss relationship between this observation and institutional characteristic of collective decision making system in Japan.

Pages: 34 pages
Date: 2006-04
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tky:jseres:2006cj155

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