"Social Norms and Voluntary Cooperations"(in Japanese)
Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara (),
Takako Fujiwara-Greve () and
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Nobue Suzuki: Department of Economics, Komazawa University
No CIRJE-J-172, CIRJE J-Series from CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo
Unlike the ordinary repeated games, in the real world, people can run away after cheating. In this paper we construct a social game, in which players can repeat Prisoners' Dilemma only if both players agree to continue the partnership. We investigate how a social sanction prevents moral hazard in such a voluntary relationship. We have three conclusions. First, it is possible to enforce voluntary long-term cooperation by trust-building. Second, the trust-building periods can be shortened under diverse strategy distributions. Third, if there is a reference letter system which conveys information that a partnership ended by an unavoidable cause, then the trust-building periods can be shortened as well.
Pages: 21 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-soc
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tky:jseres:2007cj172
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