"Communication and Coordination in Organizations" (in Japanese)
Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara (),
Noriyuki Yanagawa and
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Hirokazu Takizawa: Faculty of Economics, Chuo University
Noriyuki Yanagawa: Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo
Yasunori Watanabe: School of Grobal Studies, Tama University
No CIRJE-J-213, CIRJE J-Series from CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo
This paper analyzes a model of coordination where two agents attempt to coordinate their actions through communication. One agent (Sender) is engaged in finding the true state of nature in a stochastic environment and the action that best fits the state. The other agent (Receiver) in turn tries to ``understand'' the Sender's message and chooses his own action. Since the communication succeeds only probilistically, so does the coordination. In our model, two different modes of coordination are identified: the integral-type coordination based on the communication of soft information and the default-type coordination based on the predetermined default value. We find that the agents might choose the latter mode of coordination when the cost arising from the failed communication is high relative to the benefit from coordinating on the state-contingent best actions. Applications to the economics of organization are also discussed.
Pages: 46 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tky:jseres:2009cj213
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