An explicit bound on epsilon for nonemptiness of Epsilon-cores of games

Alexander Kovalenkov () and Myrna Wooders

Working Papers from University of Toronto, Department of Economics

Abstract: We consider parameterized collections of games without side payments and determine a bound on epsilon so that all suffciently large games in the collection have non-empty epsilon-cores. Our result makes explicit the relationship between the required size of epsilon for non-emptiness of the epsilon-core, the parameters describing the collection of games, and the size of the total player set. Given the parameters describing the collection, the larger the game, the smaller the epsilon that can be chosen.

Keywords: cooperative games; games without side payments (NTU games); large games; approximate cores; effective small groups; parameterized collections of games. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 1999-05-11
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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