Anonymous Lindahl Pricing in a Tiebout Economy with Crowding Types

John Conley and Myrna Wooders

Working Papers from University of Toronto, Department of Economics

Abstract: The ``crowding types'' model of a local public goods economy makes a distinction between crowding effects and tastes of agents. Decentralization of the core is possible both with anonymous admission prices that depend only on publicly observable information and, when technology is linear, with Lindahl (per unit) prices. Lindahl price systems are superior to admission prices since they can be specified with only a finite number of prices. Here, we show that the core is equivalent to the set of nonanonymous Lindahl equilibria, even with nonlinear technology. The core is generally larger, however, than the set of anonymous Lindahl equilibria.

JEL-codes: C62 C71 D71 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 1995-06-11
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Anonymous Lindahl Pricing in a Tiebout Economy with Crowding Types (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tor:tecipa:mwooders-98-02

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