An explicit bound on

Alexander Kovalenkov () and Myrna Wooders

Working Papers from University of Toronto, Department of Economics

Abstract: We consider parameterized collections of games without side payments and determine a bound on epsilon so that all sufficiently large games in the collection have non-empty epsilon-cores. The required size of epsilon depends on: (a) the number of approximate player types and the accuracy of this approximation; (b) the size of approximately effective small groups; (c) the size of the bound on maximal per-capita payoffs achievable in coalitions; and (d) a measure on the extent to which the payoff sets of the games are bounded away from being ``flat.'' Our result makes explicit the relationship between the required size of epsilon for non-emptiness of the epsilon-core, the parameters describing the collection.

Keywords: cooperative games; games without side payments (NTU games); approximate cores; effective small groups; parameterized collections of games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C10 C62 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 1997-02-11
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.economics.utoronto.ca/public/workingPa ... PA-MWOODERS-98-04.ps MainText (application/postscript)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tor:tecipa:mwooders-98-04

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from University of Toronto, Department of Economics 150 St. George Street, Toronto, Ontario.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by RePEc Maintainer ().