An Economic Theory of Leadership Turnover

Maria Gallego and Carolyn Pitchik

Working Papers from University of Toronto, Department of Economics

Abstract: In an infinite horizon model, a leader of a group of citizens exerts effort in each period to maintain a public good that enhances the profits of a group of kingmakers. In each period, the kingmakers decide whether to overthrow the leader so as to have a chance of becoming the leader. Consistent with the empirical literature, we find that (1) leadership turnover occurs when the kingmakers\\' expected earnings are low; (2) leadership turnover declines with duration in office; (3) leadership turnover declines as the technology for providing the public good improves; (4) leadership turnover increases as the number of kingmakers increases.

Keywords: coups d\'état; kingmakers; hazard rate; dynamic; stochastic games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D72 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 1999-09-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ind, nep-lab, nep-mic, nep-pbe and nep-pol
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Journal Article: An economic theory of leadership turnover (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tor:tecipa:pitchik-99-01

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