The Extent of the Market and the Optimal Degree of Specialization

Shouyong Shi

Working Papers from University of Toronto, Department of Economics

Abstract: In this paper I examine the socially optimal allocation in a random matching economy. The optimal allocation is supported by punishment to defections, using the public record of agents transaction. However, public record-keeping is imperfect, as an agent s transaction is updated into the public record with probability r

Keywords: Record-keeping; specialization; incentive constraints. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2002-07-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.economics.utoronto.ca/public/workingPa ... A-SHOUYONG-02-02.pdf Main Text (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tor:tecipa:shouyong-02-02

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from University of Toronto, Department of Economics 150 St. George Street, Toronto, Ontario.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by RePEc Maintainer ().