Signalling in the Internet Craze of Initial Public Offerings
Melanie Cao () and
Shouyong Shi
Working Papers from University of Toronto, Department of Economics
Abstract:
In this paper we analyze the clustering phenomenon of underpricing in initial public offerings (IPOs), where firms in a particular industry choose to issue their new shares at the same time and at great discounts. The industry consists of many firms that have private in-formation about their own qualities (high or low) and that must raise external capital first before production. In the product market, firms compete through quality ladders, where each high-quality firm monopolizes the production of a particular variety of product. We show that self-fulfilling multiple equilibria arise. In one, no firm underprices the IPO. In the other, all high-quality firms underprice their IPOs, resulting in clustering. Moreover, the clustering is more likely to occur in economic upturns than in downturns, and in an easy credit market than in a tight market.
Keywords: Initial public offerings; Signalling; Clustering; Multiple equilibria. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 E44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 44 pages
Date: 2002-07-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-ent and nep-rmg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.economics.utoronto.ca/public/workingPa ... A-SHOUYONG-02-03.pdf MainText (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: Signaling in the Internet craze of initial public offerings (2006) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tor:tecipa:shouyong-02-03
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from University of Toronto, Department of Economics 150 St. George Street, Toronto, Ontario.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by RePEc Maintainer ().