COMPETITIVE-SEARCH EQUILIBRIUM IN MONETARY ECONOMIES
Miquel Faig () and
Stella Huangfu ()
Working Papers from University of Toronto, Department of Economics
This is a comment on the work of Rocheteau and Wright (2005) who have recently introduced competitive search into monetary economics. We extend their work by eliminating the restriction that the fees market makers charge to enter a submarket must be either non-negative or identical for buyers and sellers. Without this restriction, buyers pay a positive fee to enter the submarket they visit and nothing else when they meet a seller. Sellers are remunerated by the market makers from the entry fees collected from the buyers. This trading arrangement allows buyers to perfectly predict their expenses, so the opportunity cost of holding idle money balances is eliminated.
Keywords: competitive search; monetary search. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-mac and nep-mon
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.economics.utoronto.ca/public/workingPapers/tecipa-217-1.pdf Main Text (application/pdf)
Journal Article: Competitive-search equilibrium in monetary economies (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tor:tecipa:tecipa-217
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from University of Toronto, Department of Economics 150 St. George Street, Toronto, Ontario.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by RePEc Maintainer ().