Competing for Talents

Ettore Damiano (), Hao Li and Wing Suen

Working Papers from University of Toronto, Department of Economics

Abstract: Though individuals prefer to join groups with high quality peers, there are advantages to being high up in the pecking order within a group if higher ranked members of a group have greater access to the group's resources. When two organizations try to attract members from a fixed population of heterogeneous agents, how resources are distributed among the members according to their rank affects how agents choose between the organizations. Competition between the two organizations has implications for both the equilibrium sorting of agents and the way resources are distributed within each organization. To compete more intensely for the more talented agents, both organizations are selective and give no resources to their low ranks. In both organizations, higher ranks are rewarded with more resources, with a greater rate of increase in the organization that has a lower average quality in equilibrium.

Pages: 38 pages
Date: 2005-10-22
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec
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Related works:
Journal Article: Competing for talents (2012)
Working Paper: Competing for Talents (2006)
Working Paper: Competing for Talents (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tor:tecipa:tecipa-220

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