First in Village or Second in Rome

Ettore Damiano (), Hao Li and Wing Suen

Working Papers from University of Toronto, Department of Economics

Abstract: Though individuals prefer to join groups with high quality peers, there are also advantages from being high up in the pecking order within the group. We show that sorting of agents in this environment results in an overlapping interval structure in the type space. Segregation and mixing coexist in a stable equilibrium. A greater degree of egalitarianism within organizations leads to greater segregation across organizations. Policies that are effective for lower-quality organizations to attract talent may be counterproductive for higher-quality organizations to retain talent. The degree and the pattern of segregation are shown to depend also on whether higher types are less concerned with relative ranking within the organization, on relative size of organizations, and on the extent of idiosyncratic preferences for other organizational attributes.

Pages: pages
Date: 2004-09-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-soc and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Related works:
Journal Article: FIRST IN VILLAGE OR SECOND IN ROME? (2010)
Working Paper: First in village or second in Rome? (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tor:tecipa:tecipa-221

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