The Value of Information in Public Decisions
Arvind Magesan and
Matthew Turner
Working Papers from University of Toronto, Department of Economics
Abstract:
This paper considers the problem of an imperfectly informed regulator constrained in his choice of environmental regulation by the political opposition of those affected by the policy. We compare the value of two types of information to the regulator: the social cost of pollution and the profi tability of firms present in the economy. We find that in environments where small increases in the losses to regulated firms greatly a ffect the regulator's ability to implement the policy, it is most valuable to learn the types of firms, while it is most valuable to learn the social cost of pollution when small increases in losses are relatively ine ffectual.
Keywords: Environmental Policy; Pollution; Optimal Taxation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 H23 Q52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2008-12-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-env and nep-reg
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tor:tecipa:tecipa-345
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