Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation Revisited
Benny Moldovanu () and
Working Papers from University of Toronto, Department of Economics
We consider a standard social choice environment with linear utility and one-dimensional types. We show by counterexample that, when there are at least three physical alternatives, Bayes-Nash Incentive Compatibility (BIC) and Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatibility (DIC) need no longer be equivalent. The example with three alternatives is minimal since we do obtain a general equivalence result for settings with only two social alternatives. Our negative result does not mathematically contradict the Manelli and Vincent (2010) equivalence obtained in a one-object auction setting, but it shows that BIC-DIC equivalence is only valid in restrictive environments. Our insights are based on mathematical results about the existence of monotone measures with given monotone marginals.
Keywords: Bayesian Implementation; Dominant Strategy Implementation; Equivalence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D80 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cis, nep-cta and nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tor:tecipa:tecipa-422
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