Optimal Mechanism Design without Money
Benny Moldovanu () and
Working Papers from University of Toronto, Department of Economics
We consider the standard mechanism design environment with linear utility but without monetary transfers. We first establish an equivalence between deterministic, dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanisms and generalized median voter schemes. We then use this equivalence to construct the constrained-efficient optimal mechanism for an utilitarian planner.
Keywords: Mechanism Design; Dominant Strategy Implementation; Median Voter Schemes; Social Choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: Unknown pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.economics.utoronto.ca/public/workingPapers/tecipa-481.pdf Main Text (application/pdf)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tor:tecipa:tecipa-481
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from University of Toronto, Department of Economics 150 St. George Street, Toronto, Ontario.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by RePEc Maintainer ().