Optimal Mechanism Design without Money

Alex Gershkov, Benny Moldovanu () and Xianwen Shi

Working Papers from University of Toronto, Department of Economics

Abstract: We consider the standard mechanism design environment with linear utility but without monetary transfers. We first establish an equivalence between deterministic, dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanisms and generalized median voter schemes. We then use this equivalence to construct the constrained-efficient optimal mechanism for an utilitarian planner.

Keywords: Mechanism Design; Dominant Strategy Implementation; Median Voter Schemes; Social Choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: Unknown pages
Date: 2013-04-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tor:tecipa:tecipa-481

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