Optimal Voting Rules
Benny Moldovanu () and
Working Papers from University of Toronto, Department of Economics
We study dominant strategy incentive compatible (DIC) and deterministic mechanisms in a social choice setting with several alternatives. The agents are privately informed about their preferences, and have single-crossing utility functions. Monetary transfers are not feasible. We use an equivalence between deterministic, DIC mechanisms and generalized median voter schemes to construct the constrained-efficient, optimal mechanism for an utilitarian planner. Optimal schemes for other welfare criteria such as, say, a Rawlsian maximin can be analogously obtained.
Keywords: Mechanism Design; Voting; Dominant Strategy; Utilitarian (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D72 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: Unknown pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cta, nep-mic, nep-pol and nep-upt
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Journal Article: Optimal Voting Rules (2017)
Working Paper: Optimal Voting Rules (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tor:tecipa:tecipa-493
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