Applications and Interviews: Firms' Recruiting Decisions in a Frictional Labor Market

Ronald Wolthoff

Working Papers from University of Toronto, Department of Economics

Abstract: I develop a directed search model of the labor market in which firms choose a recruiting intensity, determining the number of applicants they will interview. Interviewing applicants is costly but reveals their productivity, allowing the firm to hire better workers. I characterize the equilibrium and find that the uniqueness and cyclicality of recruiting intensity crucially depend on parameter values. Calibration of the model to the US labor market indicates a multiplicity of the equilibrium. An increase in aggregate productivity---given selection of a particular equilibrium---causes recruiting intensity to move counter to unemployment, while a shock to the equilibrium selection rule predicts the opposite pattern.

Keywords: labor market; search; frictions; recruiting; efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E24 J64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: Unknown pages
Date: 2014-11-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-lab, nep-lma and nep-mac
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Applications and Interviews: Firms’ Recruiting Decisions in a Frictional Labour Market (2018)
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