Discriminatory Information Disclosure
Hao Li () and
Working Papers from University of Toronto, Department of Economics
A seller designs a mechanism to sell a single object to a potential buyer whose private type is his incomplete information about his valuation. The seller can disclose additional information to the buyer about his valuation without observing its realization. In both discrete-type and continuous-type settings, we show that discriminatory disclosure - releasing different amounts of additional information to different buyer types - dominates full disclosure in terms of seller revenue. An implication is that the orthogonal decomposition technique, while an important tool in dynamic mechanism design, is generally invalid when information disclosure is part of the design.
Keywords: Sequential Screening; Information Disclosure; Dynamic Mechanism Design; Orthogonal Decomposition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D42 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-mic and nep-reg
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Journal Article: Discriminatory Information Disclosure (2017)
Working Paper: Discriminatory Information Disclosure (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tor:tecipa:tecipa-583
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