Discriminatory Information Disclosure

Hao Li and Xianwen Shi

Working Papers from University of Toronto, Department of Economics

Abstract: A seller designs a mechanism to sell a single object to a potential buyer whose private type is his incomplete information about his valuation. The seller can disclose additional information to the buyer about his valuation without observing its realization. In both discrete-type and continuous-type settings, we show that discriminatory disclosure - releasing different amounts of additional information to different buyer types - dominates full disclosure in terms of seller revenue. An implication is that the orthogonal decomposition technique, while an important tool in dynamic mechanism design, is generally invalid when information disclosure is part of the design.

Keywords: Sequential Screening; Information Disclosure; Dynamic Mechanism Design; Orthogonal Decomposition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D42 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: Unknown pages
Date: 2017-05-29
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-mic and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (52)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Discriminatory Information Disclosure (2017)
Working Paper: Discriminatory Information Disclosure (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tor:tecipa:tecipa-583

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