Appropriate Institutions? Traditional Governance and Public Goods Provision in Oaxaca, Mexico
Juan Chaparro (),
Marco Gonzalez-Navarro () and
Working Papers from University of Toronto, Department of Economics
What are the consequences of the adoption of traditional governance institutions among Indigenous groups for local government affairs? We study the 1995 Usos y Costumbres traditional governance reform in the state of Oaxaca, which legitimized these structures in a subset of its municipalities. We show that the degree of ethnolinguistic polarization between residents of outlying communities and residents of municipal capitals is an important barrier to the formerÃ¢â‚¬â„¢s political representation in local elections. In terms of public good provision, villages of ethnic minorities are less likely to gain electric service but more likely to gain sewerage services and public schooling.
Keywords: traditional governance; Indigenous groups; ethnic heterogeneity; political representation; public goods provision (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D74 J15 O15 O17 O18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: Unknown pages
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Journal Article: Appropriate Institutions? Traditional Governance and Public Goods Provision in Oaxaca, Mexico (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tor:tecipa:tecipa-685
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