The Effects of False Identification Laws with a Scanner Provision on Underage Alcohol-Related Traffic Fatalities
Erik Nesson () and
Vinish Shrestha ()
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Vinish Shrestha: Department of Economics, Towson University
No 2016-17, Working Papers from Towson University, Department of Economics
We examine the effects of policies aimed at restricting the use of false identification to purchase alcohol on traffic fatalities involving alcohol-impaired underage drivers. We find that the implementation of policies that incentivize alcohol retailers to adopt ID scanners reduces traffic fatalities from accidents involving 16-18 year old drivers with a BACâ‰¥0.08, but we do not find that similar policies like vertical ID laws lead to statistically significant changes in traffic fatalities involving underage impaired drivers. A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that if all remaining states passed ID scanner laws, the reduction in underage alcohol-related fatal accidents would generate nearly $730 million in annual economic benefits.
Keywords: Underage alcohol consumption; Drunk driving; DWI; False ID laws; Scanner provision. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I12 I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38 pages
Date: 2016-10, Revised 2020-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hea and nep-tre
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tow:wpaper:2016-17
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