Optimal Seedings in Elimination Tournaments

Christian Groh, Benny Moldovanu (), Aner Sela and Uwe Sunde

Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems from Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich

Abstract: We study an elimination tournament with heterogenous contestants whose ability is common-knowledge. Each pair-wise match is modeled as an all-pay auction where the winner gets the right to compete at the next round. Equilibrium efforts are in mixed strategies, yielding rather complex play dynamics: the endogenous win probabilities in each match depend on the outcome of other matches through the identity of the expected opponent in the next round. The designer can seed the competitors according to their ranks. For tournaments with four players we find optimal seedings with respect to three different criteria: 1) maximization of total effort in the tournament; 2) maximization of the probability of a final among the two top ranked teams; 3) maximization of the win probability for the top player. In addition, we find the seedings ensuring that higher ranked players have a higher probability to win the tournament. Finally, we compare the theoretical predictions with data from NCAA basketball tournaments.

Keywords: Elimination tournaments; Seedings; All-Pay Auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-07
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Optimal seedings in elimination tournaments (2012)
Working Paper: Optimal seedings in elimination tournaments (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:trf:wpaper:140

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