On the Stability of Research Joint Ventures: Implications for Collusion

Jo Seldeslachts, Tomaso Duso and Enrico Pennings

Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems from Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich

Abstract: Though there is a body of theoretical literature on research joint ventures (RJV) participation facilitating collusion, empirical tests are rare. Even more so, there are few empirical tests on the general theme of collusion. This note tries to fill this gap by assuming a correspondence between the stability of research joint ventures and collusion. By using data from the US Nation Cooperation Research Act, we show that large RJVs in concentrated industries are more stable and hence more suspect to collusion.

Keywords: research joint ventures; product market collusion; empirical test (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L24 L44 L52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ino and nep-tid
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Related works:
Journal Article: On the Stability of Research Joint Ventures: Implications for Collusion (2012)
Working Paper: On The Stability of Research Joint Ventures: Implications for Collusion (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:trf:wpaper:240

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