A dynamic auction for multi-object procurement under a hard budget constraint

Ludwig Ensthaler and Thomas Giebe

Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems from Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich

Abstract: We present a new dynamic auction for procurement problems where payments are bounded by a hard budget constraint and money does not enter the procurer's objective function.

Keywords: Auctions; Mechanism Design; Knapsack Problem; Dominant Strategy; Budget; Procurement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 D44 D45 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Journal Article: A dynamic auction for multi-object procurement under a hard budget constraint (2014)
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