Hierarchical Structures and Dynamic Incentives
Dongsoo Shin () and
Roland Strausz ()
Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems from Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich
We study the optimal hierarchical structure of an organization under limited commitment. The organization cannot make a long term commitment to wages and output levels, while it can commit to its hierarchical structure. We show that the optimal hierarchical structure is horizontal when it is highly likely that the employees are efficient or inefficient. By contrast, when such likelihood is intermediate or output does not expand very fast over time, the optimal hierarchical structure is vertical - with a vertical hierarchy, the organization can mitigate dynamic incentive problems linked to limited commitment.
Keywords: Dynamic Incentives; Organization Design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec and nep-cta
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:trf:wpaper:318
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