Mediated Contracts and Mechanism Design

Roland Strausz

Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems from Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich

Abstract: This note relates the mechanisms that are based on mediated contracts of Rahman and Obara (2010) to the mechanisms of Myerson (1982). It shows that the mechanisms in Myerson (1982) are more general in that they encompass the mechanisms based on mediated contracts. It establishes an equivalence between the two classes if mediated contracts are allowed to be stochastic.

Keywords: mediatedcontract; mechanismdesign; revelationprinciple; moralhazard (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Mediated contracts and mechanism design (2012)
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