Existence of a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in imperfectly discriminating contests

Cédric Wasser

Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems from Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich

Abstract: We consider a general class of imperfectly discriminating contests with privately informed players. We show that findings by Athey (2001) imply the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in monotone pure strategies.

Keywords: contest; imperfectly discriminating; asymmetric information; equilibrium existence; interdependent values (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 D74 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-gth
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Related works:
Journal Article: A note on Bayesian Nash equilibria in imperfectly discriminating contests (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:trf:wpaper:331

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