Information sharing in contests

Dan Kovenock, Florian Morath and Johannes Münster

Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems from Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich

Abstract: We study the incentives to share private information ahead of contests, such as markets with promotional competition, procurement contests, or R&D. We consider the cases where firms have (i) independent values and (ii) common values of winning the contest. In both cases, when decisions to share information are made independently, sharing information is strictly dominated. With independent values, an industry-wide agreement to share information can arise in equilibrium. Expected effort is lower with than without information sharing. With common values, an industry-wide agreement to share information never arises in equilibrium. Expected effort is higher with than without information sharing.

Keywords: information sharing; contest; all-pay auction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 D44 D74 D82 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cta and nep-ino
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Information Sharing in Contests (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:trf:wpaper:334

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