The efficient provision of public goods through non-distortionary tax contests

Thomas Giebe and Paul Schweinzer

Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems from Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich

Abstract: We use a simple balanced budget contest to collect taxes on a private good in order to ?nance a pure public good. We show that-with an appropriately chosen structure of winning probabilities-this contest can provide the public good efficiently and without distorting private consumption. We provide extensions to multiple public goods and private taxation sources, asymmetric preferences, and show the mechanism’s robustness across these settings.

Keywords: Taxation; Contests; Efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-pbe
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Related works:
Journal Article: Consuming your way to efficiency: Public goods provision through non-distortionary tax lotteries (2014)
Working Paper: Consuming your Way to Efficiency: Public Goods Provision through Non-Distortionary Tax Lotteries (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:trf:wpaper:352

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