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Pricing a Package of Services - When (not) to bundle

Felix Ketelaar and Dezsoe Szalay ()

Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems from Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich

Abstract: We study a tractable two-dimensional model of price discrimination. Consumers combine a rigid with a more flexible choice, such as choosing the location of a house and its quality or size. We show that the optimal pricing scheme involves no bundling if consumer types are affiliated. Conversely, if consumer types are negatively affiliated over some portion of types then some bundling occurs.

Keywords: Price discrimination; Bundling; Monopoly; Multidimensional screening (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D42 D82 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind, nep-mic and nep-mkt
Date: 2014-12
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:trf:wpaper:487

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