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Repeated Implementation

Helmuts Azacis () and Péter Vida ()

Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems from Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich

Abstract: We prove that a social choice function is repeatedly implementable if and only if it is dynamically monotonic when the number of agents is at least three. We show how to test dynamic monotonicity by building an associated repeated game. It follows that a weaker version of Maskin monotonicity is necessary and sufficient among the social choice functions that are efficient. As an application, we show that utilitarian social choice functions, which can only be one-shot implemented with side-payments, are repeatedly implementable, as continuation payoffs can play the role of transfers. Under some additional assumptions, our results also apply when the number of agents is two.

Keywords: Mechanism Design; Dynamic Monotonicity; Efficiency; Repeated Implementation; Repeated Games; Approximation of the Equilibrium Set; Sufficient and Necessary Condition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
Date: 2015-09-17
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Journal Article: Repeated implementation: A practical characterization (2019) Downloads
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