License Auctions with Royalty Contracts for Losers
Thomas Giebe () and
Elmar Wolfstetter ()
Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems from Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich
This paper revisits the standard analysis of licensing a cost reducing innovation by an outside innovator to a Cournot oligopoly. We propose a new mechanism that combines elements of a license auction with royalty licensing by granting the losers of the auction the option to sign a royalty contract. The optimal new mechanism eliminates the losses from exclusionary licensing without reducing biddersâ€™ surplus; therefore, it is more profitable than both standard license auctions and pure royalty licensing. We also take into account that the number of licenses must be an integer, which is typically ignored in the literature.
Keywords: Patents; Licensing; Auctions; Royalty; Innovation; R&D; Mechanism Design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 D43 D44 D45 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ino and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:trf:wpaper:96
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