Bank Executive Experience with Clearinghouse Loan Certificates

Christopher Hoag ()
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Christopher Hoag: Department of Economics, Trinity College

No 1903, Working Papers from Trinity College, Department of Economics

Abstract: Does borrowing from a lender of last resort in the previous financial crisis encourage borrowing from a lender of last resort in the next financial crisis? In the late nineteenth century, clearinghouse loan certificates served as an early lender of last resort program. This paper uses individual bank data for New York City banks from four financial crises over the period 1884 to 1907 to evaluate senior bank executive experience with borrowing clearinghouse loan certificates. The results provide some evidence that bank presidents with experience at the same bank during the previous crisis borrowed larger amounts of loan certificates in the subsequent crisis.

Keywords: lender of last resort; executive; learning; clearinghouse loan certificate. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G32 N21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 2019-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn and nep-his
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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http://www3.trincoll.edu/repec/WorkingPapers2019/WP19-03.pdf Second version, 2020 (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tri:wpaper:1903

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