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Personal Autonomy in Trust-Based Interactions. An Experimental Analysis

Matteo Ploner

No 701, CEEL Working Papers from Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia

Abstract: The paper experimentally investigates the interactions between restrictions to personal autonomy and reciprocity in a Principal-Agent relationship. Previous experimental contributions have shown that actions aimed at restricting decisional autonomy are likely to reduce reciprocity in trust- based relationships. Results in our experiment, which is a modified version of the Investment Game, differ from previous findings and conform more to standard economic predictions. Principals in our interaction do not support the self-determination of agents. On the other side, agents do not show any positive reciprocity when allowed to freely determine their behavior in the game. (This is an updated version of the CEEL Working Paper 2-05)

Keywords: Principal-Agent relationship; Trust; Reciprocity; Self-Determination; Incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 D23 M50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-soc
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