Does Participating in a Collective Decision Affect the Levels of Contributions Provided? An Experimental Investigation

Francesca Bortolami () and Luigi Mittone

No 902, CEEL Working Papers from Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia

Abstract: From a purely theoretical perspective, there is no reason to expect that different levels of contributions in public goods games are associated with the same sanctioning/rewarding rule. The efficiency of a norm should be independent of its enactment procedure. On the contrary, multidisciplinary and empirical considerations suggest that individuals may behave differently, according to the level of their direct involvement. The question whether participation in norm enactment results in more contributory gap than when the same norm is received, has not been addressed in public good literature so far. Our three experiments show a behavioural regularity: participating in a normative enactment generates different contributory effects, with respect to the case when the sanctioning norm is merely received.

Keywords: participation; public good games; free riding (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-hpe and nep-pbe
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:trn:utwpce:0902

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