Social Effects in a Multi-Agent Investment Game. An Experimental Analysis

Luigi Mittone and Matteo Ploner

No 905, CEEL Working Papers from Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia

Abstract: We experimentally investigate social effects in a principal-agent setting with incomplete contracts. The strategic interaction scheme is based on the well-known Investment Game (Berg et al., 1995). In our setting four agents (i.e., trustees) and one principal (i.e., trustor) are interacting and the access to choices of peers in the group of trustees is experimentally manipulated. Overall, subjects are positively influenced by peer's choices they observe. However, the positive interaction between choices is not strong enough to raise the reciprocity of those observing at the same level of those whose choices are observed.

Date: 2009
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cta, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-soc
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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