When do the Expectations of Others Matter? An Experiment on Distributional Justice and Guilt Aversion
Riccardo Ghidoni () and
No 1403, CEEL Working Papers from Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia
In a modified dictator game experiment, we study how distributional justice, measured by the proportionality between effort exerted and rewards obtained, and guilt feelings triggered by othersï¿½ expectations affect dictatorï¿½s choices. We consider these two sources of behavior in isolation and in interaction. Our results suggest that both justice concerns and guilt aversion are important drivers of behavior. However, the expectations of others are more relevant when the choice environment is likely to induce less equitable outcomes.
Keywords: Justice; Guilt Aversion; Entitlement Rights; Experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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