When do the Expectations of Others Matter? An Experiment on Distributional Justice and Guilt Aversion

Riccardo Ghidoni and Matteo Ploner

No 1403, CEEL Working Papers from Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia

Abstract: In a modified dictator game experiment, we study how distributional justice, measured by the proportionality between effort exerted and rewards obtained, and guilt feelings triggered by others� expectations affect dictator�s choices. We consider these two sources of behavior in isolation and in interaction. Our results suggest that both justice concerns and guilt aversion are important drivers of behavior. However, the expectations of others are more relevant when the choice environment is likely to induce less equitable outcomes.

Keywords: Justice; Guilt Aversion; Entitlement Rights; Experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-hpe and nep-law
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:trn:utwpce:1403

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