Communication, sequentiality and strategic power. A prisonersï¿½ dilemma experiment
Luigi Mittone and
No 1603, CEEL Working Papers from Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia
One shot two-player sequential game experiments are characterized by an asymmetry in the observed payoffs of participants. In the ultimatum game, for example, the distribution favors first-movers, whereas in the in- vestment game, it favors second movers. A comparison to sequential move games are symmetric simultaneous move games, which entail symmetry in actions and payoffs. We experimentally examine the role of first-mover anticipated communication on the inter-player strategic power dynamics that exist in a symmetric simultaneous move prisonersï¿½ dilemma, and a sequential move investment game, and show that such communication has a significant effect in inducing payoff asymmetries in symmetric games.
Keywords: strategic power; communication; prisonersï¿½ dilemma; investment game; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-pke
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:trn:utwpce:1603
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in CEEL Working Papers from Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Marco Tecilla ().