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Communication, sequentiality and strategic power. A prisoners� dilemma experiment

Luigi Mittone and Andrew Musau

No 1603, CEEL Working Papers from Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia

Abstract: One shot two-player sequential game experiments are characterized by an asymmetry in the observed payoffs of participants. In the ultimatum game, for example, the distribution favors first-movers, whereas in the in- vestment game, it favors second movers. A comparison to sequential move games are symmetric simultaneous move games, which entail symmetry in actions and payoffs. We experimentally examine the role of first-mover anticipated communication on the inter-player strategic power dynamics that exist in a symmetric simultaneous move prisoners� dilemma, and a sequential move investment game, and show that such communication has a significant effect in inducing payoff asymmetries in symmetric games.

Keywords: strategic power; communication; prisoners� dilemma; investment game; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-pke
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