Cash posters in the lab
Marco Faillo (),
Luigi Mittone and
No 1801, CEEL Working Papers from Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia
Our paper reproduces the cash posters framework aÌ€ la Homans (1953, 1954) in a laboratory setting with a twofold aim: first of all, it explores the gift-exchange between employers and employees, both in terms of wage- effort and in terms of effort-potential leniency in punishment; secondly, it investigates whether employeesâ€™ behavior is driven also by solidarity concerns towards their unlucky peers. We propose a novel experimental design with a modified version of the gift-exchange game with real effort, punishment, and multiple rounds (Fehr et al., 1997): each employer is matched with two employees and she has the possibility to punish each of them if their individual production is lower than that asked. Each employeeâ€™s production risks to be reduced by a random intervention and, in our treatment, each employee has the possibility to renounce to a part of his production to give it to his coworker in need. Our data support the well-known relation between wage and effort, but suggest that employers are not willing to overlook employees non-compliance, neither when employees exerted high effort in the past, nor when their coworkers exert high effort. In our treatment, employees not only exploit the possibility to help their needy peers, but they tend also to exert higher effort towards their employers. Consequently, the employers are those who earn more from employeesâ€™ solidarity, and the gap in earnings between employers and employees becomes even greater in our treatment.
Keywords: Solidarity; Gift-exchange; Reciprocity; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 M52 D91 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:trn:utwpce:1801
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in CEEL Working Papers from Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Marco Tecilla ().