EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Trade Liberalization and Environmental Taxation in Federal Systems

Per Fredriksson and Xenia Matschke

No 2014-04, Research Papers in Economics from University of Trier, Department of Economics

Abstract: The literature on trade liberalization and environment has not considered federal structures. This paper shows how the design of environmental policy in a federal system has implications for the effects of trade reform. Trade liberalization leads to a decline in pollution taxes regardless of whether pollution taxes are set at the federal (centralized) or local (decentralized) level, and it increases social welfare. The effect under a decentralized system is smaller than if these taxes are set by the federal government, and pollution emissions therefore decline in this case. Moreover, majority bias interacts with trade liberalization if federal taxes are used.

Keywords: trade and environment; environmental policy; trade liberalization; environmental federalism; political economy; majority bias; social welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F1 H2 H7 Q2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-env, nep-int and nep-res
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.uni-trier.de/fileadmin/fb4/prof/VWL/EWF/Research_Papers/2014-04.pdf First version, 2014 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Trade Liberalization and Environmental Taxation in Federal Systems (2016) Downloads
Working Paper: Trade Liberalization and Environmental Taxation in Federal Systems (2014) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:trr:wpaper:201404

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Research Papers in Economics from University of Trier, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Matthias Neuenkirch ().

 
Page updated 2025-02-05
Handle: RePEc:trr:wpaper:201404