The Effective Design of Managerial Incentive Systems:Combining Theoretical Principles and Practical Trade'-offs

Alessandro Rossi ()

No 47, Quaderni DISA from Department of Computer and Management Sciences, University of Trento, Italy

Abstract: On the use of theoretical developments in agency economics for the practical design of incentive- and performance-based compensation systems.

Keywords: managerial compensation; principal-agent theory; incentive and performance based compensation systems (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-05, Revised 2003-06-29
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