How Laws Affect Contracts: Evidence from Yankee Bond Covenants
John Wald,
Yaxuan Qi and
Lukas Roth
Additional contact information
John Wald: The University of Texas at San Antonio
Lukas Roth: Pennsylvania State University
No 65, Working Papers from College of Business, University of Texas at San Antonio
Abstract:
We examine how country-level legal and institutional differences in creditor and shareholder rights shape the use of bond covenants. Using comprehensive debt covenant information for a sample of Yankee bonds issued by firms from more than 50 countries, we find that bond contracts for firms incorporated in countries with stronger creditor rights use fewer restrictive covenants. This finding suggests that creditor rights laws substitute for debt covenants in reducing the agency cost of debt. On the other hand, bond contracts for firms incorporated in legal regimes with stronger shareholder rights include more covenants, suggesting that greater shareholder rights may actually increase the shareholder-bondholder agency conflict. These results are robust to alternative measures of creditor rights and shareholder rights. We also document that stronger firm-level corporate governance is positively related to the use of restrictive covenants even after controlling for country institutions.
Keywords: Covenants; contracts; creditor rights; shareholder rights; corporate governance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G38 K22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 55 pages
Date: 2009-03-25
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
http://interim.business.utsa.edu/wps/fin/0065FIN-452-2009.pdf Full text (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tsa:wpaper:00110fin
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from College of Business, University of Texas at San Antonio Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wendy Frost ().